Author: Alexander Moisseenko
Language and Identity at the Core
The roots of the Transnistrian conflict can be traced back to 1989, when Moldova—then still a Soviet republic—adopted a law "on Functioning of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR". It guarantees the usage of Russian “on the territory along with Moldavian language as a language of international (interethnic) communication”. The Russian language was also given such a status in most of the other successor states of the Soviet Union.
In practice, Moldova remained largely bilingual. Russian is still widely spoken in everyday life, particularly in urban areas. Nonetheless, the Kremlin exploited perceived threats to the Russian language as a justification to secure its geopolitical sphere of influence in Moldova by military means.
The Birth of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic
Opposition to the language law culminated in the proclamation of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) in August 1991, ensuring Russian remained an official language. Earlier, a series of referenda had been held in the region under questionable circumstances. Human Rights Watch documented incidents of voter fraud and violent reprisals against those who refused to participate.
While Moldova’s Supreme Soviet declared the secession illegal, the separatists began building parallel state structures under the supervision of the 14th Russian Guards Army stationed there.
According to a report by the human rights organization Memorial, a battalion of the Transnistrian national guards was formed in Bender (Tighina) under command of Yurii Kostenko who recruited many ex-convicts. As stated by Memorial, these militias “were reported to have looted homes of local residents and requisitioned private cars without authorization” and “illegally sold as many as 1,300 pieces of fire arms”.
Clashes between Moldovan police trying to re-establish control over the territories escalated in the spring of 1992. On March 1–2, paramilitary forces seized a police station in Dubăsari. When Russian tanks and artillery—operating under the 14th Guards Army—entered Moldovan towns such as Bender, Cocieri, and Coșnița, Moldova’s National Security Minister Anatol Plugaru warned: "We are at war with Russia, good people! Great Russian chauvinism is still alive".
Photo: Alexander Moisseenko
Russian Influence: Covert Support and Open Rhetoric
While the Kremlin officially denied direct involvement in the beginning of the war, its actions told a different story. Moscow did not tolerate separatist movements on its own territory—refusing, for example, to recognize Chechen independence—but in Moldova, it covertly encouraged secessionism and showed its support more and more clearly towards the end of the war.
When Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoy visited the city of Bender, he called for the involvement of the 14th Russian Army so that the “people of Transnistria could achieve their independence”. In his eyes, Transnistria was also “a small part of Russia” and Rutskoy accused Moldovans of wiping “their feet on Russia and its citizens”.
Indeed, from the very beginning many personnel of the Russian 14th Guards Army defected and joined Transnistrian units and participated in the fighting as part of the Armed Forces of Transnistria. PMR Defense Minister Stefan Cisac acknowledged that the PMR acquired weapons from Russia’s 14th Army although he declined to give specifics. Meanwhile, Major General Yurii Nekatchev, commander of the 14th Army stated that certain units had taken part in the fighting but claimed they acted independently and against his direct orders.
His successor General Alexander Lebed was more explicit in his opinions. He stated that the right-bank city of Bender was an integral part of the PMR, describing the PMR as a small part of Russia and the Transnistria region as the key to the Balkans. Moreover, the Russian General accused the Moldovan government of being "illegitimate", referred to the Moldovan defense minister as a "cannibal" and described the Moldovan president, Mircea Snegur, as a “fascist” who should be hanged.
Turning Point: The Battle for Bender
Photo: Alexander Moisseenko
In June 1992, General Lebed ordered Russian troops to attack Moldovan forces directly around the city of Bender. When the city was captured by Moldovan forces on 19 June, tanks from the 14th Army crossed the bridge over the Dnestr. This event is considered to be the turning point of the battle. The 14th Army involvement in the recapture of Bender indicated a shift in Russia’s approach not only to the Transnistrian conflict but also to its broader policy concerning the Near Abroad.
The war ended on July 21, 1992 with a ceasefire agreement. The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic remained de facto independent, but to this day has not been formally recognized by any state in the world, not even Russia. The war caused a total of 1,132 deaths on both sides, including 310 civilians. Over 3,500 individuals were injured. Around 130,000 people were displaced within the country, while about 70,000 fled to other states.
Peacekeeping Efforts and Broken Promises
Already in April 1992, Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev proposed that Moldova’s territorial integrity should be guaranteed by the four powers, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Romania. He suggested using the 14th Army as a peace-keeping force, a proposal that was initially refused by the other three countries.
Nevertheless, following the ceasefire agreement on July 21, the parties to the conflict agreed to initiate the Joint Control Commission, a trilateral peacekeeping force and joint military command structure from Moldova, Transnistria, and Russia. At the 1999 OSCE Summit in Istanbul, Russia promised to withdraw its troops from Transnistria by 2002. Yet the Kremlin has not fulfilled this promise. A 2018 UN General Assembly resolution once again called for a full Russian withdrawal—but to no avail.
Symbols of resistance
Photo: Alexander Moisseenko
Molovata Nouă and Cocieri are among the few communes on the eastern side of the Dniestr river that are under the full control of Moldova. As the majority Romanian-speaking population was able to defeat the Russian occupation forces here, the communes are regarded as symbols of Moldovan resistance.
Accessing Molovata Nouă and Cocieri without crossing Russian-held territory is only possible by ferry. Every hour, boats shuttle residents and visitors across the river. Even though the area is controlled by Moldova, armed soldiers in Russian uniforms as well as a BMP with the Russian flag wait on the other bank.
A small exhibition in the Museum of History and Ethnography of Molovata Nouă reminds of the locals of the village who successfully defended their home from Russian occupation but lost their lives. Armed only with leftover weapons and receiving minimal support from the central government in Chisinau, the locals could stop the Russian advance.
Just meters from Russian checkpoints, a flagpole bearing the European Union flag stands in front of the public library, symbolizing Moldova’s uncertain future.
The Conflict’s Lingering Consequences
Many Moldovans express little hope that Russia will fulfill its long-standing promise to end the illegal occupation. Instead, there are concerns about an increase in the contingent of an estimated 1,500 soldiers. In June of this year, Moldova’s prime minister Dorin Recean warned that Russia might aim to interfere in the country’s next parliamentary election in order to deploy additional 10,000 Russian troops in the occupied regions —a threat with serious implications for both Moldova and neighboring Ukraine.
In response, Moldovan authorities have tightened security. Belarusian and Russian citizens must expect lengthy questioning when entering Moldova - measures to counteract possible Kremlin interference in the upcoming elections. On June 24, officials decided to ban 195 athletes and activists, mostly citizens of Russia and Belarus from entering the country.
President Maia Sandu’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity currently leads the polls, but the outcome of the September 28 parliamentary elections remains uncertain. In any case, these elections remain geopolitically significant far beyond Moldova’s borders.
