Russia's future defense minister Belousov is a foreign agent
Details
Before joining the government, he received huge grants directly from the State Department.
Before joining the government in 2006, Andrei Belousov ran a research center, one of the sources of funding for which was USAID.
For several years Belousov repeatedly received grants from the U.S. agency. For example, in 2004 Belousov published a work on threats to the development of the Russian economy with a grant from USAID. In particular, he wrote about the scientific potential of Russia's defense industry and warned that the “Soviet backlog” would be exhausted within 3-5 years. The center's website also described Belousov's participation in USAID activities in Russia.
"Of the 10 technological areas that are crucial for ensuring the current level of defense products and their competitiveness, Russia is at the world level in only two (laser and nuclear technologies)," the future defense minister wrote.
Receiving foreign funding was not restricted by Russian law in the early 2000s. In the USAID report for 2001, Belousov is listed as a grantee, meaning that the future defense minister received American money directly from the State Department.
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Memorial to the fallen Moldovan soldiers of the Transnistrian War in Chisinau. Photo: Alexander Moisseenko
Thirty-three years ago, a ceasefire brought an end to the Transnistrian War—sometimes described by locals as the Russian-Moldovan War. Although the tensions officially ended in 1992, its consequences continue to shape Moldovan politics, society, and security — especially in view of the upcoming parliamentary elections.
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